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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that Keynes’s analysis of the marginal efficiency of capital is 
consistent with the principle of effective demand and is, in this sense, characteristically 
different from the related classical or neoclassical conceptualisations. Furthermore, the 
notion of the marginal efficiency of capital is used not only as an explanation of the short 
term fluctuations in the level of economic activity but also as an interpretation of more 
serious long term fluctuations such as that of the great depression. Finally, some of 
Keynes’s economic policy proposals are critically evaluated. 
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1. Introduction 
The question of the long-run prospects of profitability and its association with the 
stage of the economy looms large in the works of the major economists of the 
past. Keynes’s analysis of profitability (encapsulated in his notion of the marginal 
efficiency of capital) and its evolution, although sketchy, is nevertheless 
consistent with his fundamental principle about the causal priority of investment 
over saving and is in this sense innovative and characteristically different to both 
the classical and also the neoclassical analyses. Keynes uses his notion of the 
marginal efficiency of capital (henceforth MEC) not only as an explanation of the 
short term fluctuations in the level of economic activity, but as an interpretation of 
more serious long term fluctuations such as that of the great depression. In 
addition, Keynes proposes specific economic policies in an effort to prolong the 
expansionary stage of the economy and, at the same time, mitigate the adverse 
economic effects of depressions.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and 
critically evaluates Keynes’s argument on the MEC. Section 3 explains why a 
sustained fall in the MEC may lead to an economic crisis. Section 4 deals with 
economic policy issues and the last Section presents a summary and some 
concluding remarks.  
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2. Keynes’s Theory of the Falling MEC 
Keynes’s analysis of profitability and its evolution is mainly described in chapters 
11 and 12 of the General Theory, where investment, the most volatile component 
of his theory of effective demand, depends on the MEC in conjunction to the long 
term interest rate. Specifically, Keynes argues that when an entrepreneur buys 
investment goods in reality he buys the right to a series of future incomes that he 
expects to earn (during the useful lifetime of the capital good) by selling the 
product after the subtraction of current expenses. More specifically, Keynes 
defines «the marginal efficiency of capital as being equal to that rate of discount 
which would make the present value of the series of annuities given by the returns 
expected from the capital asset during its life just equal to its supply price» (GT, 
135). He further notes that the supply price of the capital good should not be 
confused with its current price, but rather with the «price which would just induce 
a manufacturer newly to produce an additional unit of such assets, i.e., what is 
sometimes called its replacement cost» (GT, 135). Clearly, the definition of the 
MEC depends on expected and not on current or past profits and also these 
expected profits of a project are not evaluated against a stock of capital but rather 
against the flow of capital, that is, the increment of the existing capital stock, in 
particular the price of new equipment investment.1 Thus Keynes notes that the 
MEC «depends on the rate of return expected to be obtainable on money if it were 
invested in a newly produced asset; not on the historical result of what an 
investment has yielded on its original cost if we look back on its record after its 
life is over» (GT, 135).  
 It is interesting to note that the assumption of expected returns is absolutely 
necessary to Keynes in order to be consistent with his overall theory of effective 
demand, according to which the decisions to invest determine saving. If Keynes 
had assumed current or past profits instead of expected in his definition of the 
MEC, then he would have essentially accepted that saving determines investment. 
                     
1 This is the reason why Pasinetti (1997, 207) approves Abba Lerner’s use of the term marginal 
efficiency of investment instead of capital. Eisner (1997, 196) although in agreement with Lerner 
nevertheless prefers to maintain both terms. In this paper we opted for the term MEC although we 
know that Keynes refers to the flow of investment and not the stock of capital (see also Chick, 
1983, ch. 6; LeRoy, 1983 and Asimakopoulos, 1991, ch. 4). 
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Although the MEC depends on expected and not realized profits, which of course 
are fraught with uncertainty, Keynes was, nevertheless, absolutely certain about 
the falling MEC schedule, that he did not feel that there is a need for any detailed 
analysis. The gist of his argument on the falling MEC is contained in just a single 
paragraph which we cite in toto: «If there is an increased investment in any given 
type of capital during any period of time, the marginal efficiency of that type of 
capital will diminish as the investment in it is increased, partly because the 
prospective yield will fall as the supply of that type of capital is increased, and 
partly because, as a rule, pressure on the facilities for producing that type of 
capital will cause its supply price to increase; the second of these factors being 
usually the more important in producing equilibrium in the short run, but the 
longer the period in view the more does the first factor takes its place. Thus for 
each type of capital we can built up a schedule, showing by how much investment 
in it will have to increase within the period, in order that its marginal efficiency 
should fall to any given figure. We can then aggregate these schedules for all the 
different types of capital, so as to provide a schedule relating the rate of aggregate 
investment to the corresponding marginal efficiency of capital in general which 
that rate of investment will establish. We shall call this the investment demand–
schedule; or, alternatively, the schedule of marginal efficiency of capital» (GT, 
136).  
  In the above succinctly written paragraph there are two intertwined 
arguments concerning the falling profitability. The first refers to short run and the 
supply side of the market, where the investment expenditures of a firm imply that 
competition with other firms over resources gets more intense. However, the 
supply of resources is given in the short run; as a consequence, their price 
increases and profits decrease for each of the competing firms. Hence, Keynes 
assumes inverted L-shape unit cost curves, which imply that as competition gets 
more intense firms are bound to operate at the increasing part of their unit cost 
curves. For example, he notes «[...] in the short period supply price usually 
increases with increasing output, on account either of the physical fact of 
diminishing returns or the tendency of the cost-unit to rise in terms of money 
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when output increases (GT, 328). This argument, as Keynes notes, works more 
effectively in the short run and weakens with the passage of time inasmuch 
investment expands the capacity to produce.   
The long run argument refers to the demand side of the economy. Hence, 
Keynes’s idea is that as a firm increases its investment and expands its output, it 
would become extremely difficult to keep its sales growing at the going price. Its 
sales can grow pari passu with its productive capacity only if the firm reduces its 
selling price. Consequently, expected profits fall and so does the MEC. It is 
important to stress, once again, that the supply and demand arguments in Keynes 
are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they may complement each other 
thereby reinforcing his overall argument for a falling MEC (Eatwell, 1989). 
 For the total economy, we simply add the behaviour of individual firms. 
Since for each particular firm there is an inverse relationship between the MEC 
and investment it follows that this is true for the economy as a whole. It is 
important to point out that for Keynes the fall of the MEC, in and of itself, does 
not automatically imply a reduction in investment expenditures. Everything 
depends on whether or not the rate of interest on loans is lower than the MEC. If 
for some reason the rate of interest is kept below the MEC, then there always 
exists an investment motive despite the falling MEC. This is the reason why 
Keynes, in chapter 24 of the General Theory, argues for the «euthanasia of 
rentiers», which can be achieved as the rate of interest approximates zero.  
 Keynes’s analysis of falling profitability is too brief and certainly does not 
contain the subtleties that one finds, for example, in the classical economists. 
This, however, by no means implies that there are no important insights and 
innovations. In fact, Keynes in chapter 11 of the General Theory has some 
original contributions such as that the MEC is based on expected profits from 
current investment and the notion of uncertainty, a view which is consistent with 
the idea that the arrow of causality is running from investment to saving. The 
importance of these points, however, has passed unnoticed even by Keynes’s 
major commentators (e.g., Dillard, 1948, ch. 7, Hansen, 1953, ch. 5 and 
Asimakopoulos, 1991, ch. 4). Keynes must also be blamed for that since he 
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underestimates, in at least two instances, his own contributions by crediting the 
definition of the MEC to Irving Fisher. The first is in the General Theory (140-1) 
and the second in 1937 in Fisher’s festschrift (Collected Writings XIV, 101). The 
similarity, however, is only superficial and reminiscent of Keynes’s style to find 
precursors of his views. For example, Keynes (GT, ch. 23) refers to Malthus as the 
precursor of the theory of effective demand, and to Fisher as the precursor of the 
MEC. We know that neither Malthus nor Fisher share Keynes’s view of 
investment determining saving and that the equality of saving and investment 
comes about through variations in output. This view of Keynes is 
characteristically different to Fisher’s and the neoclassical economists who posited 
that the equality of full employment saving and investment is brought about by 
variations in the rate of interest. Furthermore, an identification of Keynes’s theory 
of the MEC with that of Fisher’s, as Garegnani (1978-1979) has pointed out, leads 
to two inconsistencies: first Fisher’s expected profits are determined by marginal 
productivities of capital and labour; and second Fisher’s «MEC» presupposes full 
employment of both capital and labour. An argument that prima facie contradicts 
the quintessence of the General Theory according to which the cause of 
unemployment is the lack of adequate effective demand and that the price system 
left to its own devices cannot generate full employment.  
As for the marginal productivity theory of value and distribution, Keynes 
ruled out such a theory from his overall perspective of the way in which the actual 
capitalist economy works. For example, in the 1933 draft of several chapters of 
the General Theory Keynes (Collected Writings XIII) introduces the distinction 
between a real exchange economy and a monetary economy. In the latter the 
presence of fiat money radically changes the law of production with respect to the 
former, that is, the real exchange or barter economy of classical and neoclassical 
economics. More specifically, Keynes resorts to the distinction initially introduced 
by Marx between the simple commodity production (Keynes’s real exchange 
economy) in which products are exchanged for the sake of consumption and a 
capitalist (Keynes’s monetary) economy, where production of commodities is for 
the sake of profit in monetary terms. This transition to the monetary economy 
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involves the presence of fiat money which radically changes the laws of 
production of the classical theory: «The classical theory supposes that the 
readiness of the entrepreneur to start up a productive process depends on the 
amount of value in terms of product which he expects to fall to his share; i.e. that 
only an expectation of more product for himself will induce him to offer more 
employment. But in an entrepreneur economy this is a wrong analysis of the 
nature of business calculation. An entrepreneur is interested, not in the amount of 
product, but in the amount of money which will fall to his share. He will increase 
his output if by so doing he expects to increase his money profit, even though this 
profit represents a smaller quantity of product than before. The explanation of this 
is evident. The employment of factors of production to increase output involves 
the entrepreneur in the disbursement, not of product, but of money» (Collected 
Writings XXIX, 82). Keynes, a few years latter in the General Theory continues to 
assume a monetary economy and explicitly rules out the marginal productivity as 
this can be judged from the following: «If capital becomes less scarce, the excess 
yield will diminish, without its having become less productive—at least in the 
physical sense […] the only reason why an asset offers a prospect of yielding 
during its life services having an aggregate value greater than its initial price is 
because it is scarce […]» (GT, 213).2  
It has been argued (Dimand, 1995) that Keynes perhaps was not aware of 
all the details of Fisher’s analysis and that maybe he just did not find it appropriate 
to explain their conceptual differences in a book honouring Fisher’s contributions. 
We know that Keynes disregarded Fisher’s notion of the «MEC» in his lectures, at 
a time as early as 1934 (Dimand, 1995, 257) and that he admitted, in his 
correspondence with Harrod (August, 27 and 30, 1936), that his definition of the 
                     
2 Garegnani (1977-1978) lamented that the MEC is the «Trojan Horse» of the price of capital 
goods through which the marginal productivity theory of distribution will undermine Keynes’s 
theory of effective demand. Keynes however disconnected his notion of the MEC from the 
marginal productivity theory of income distribution, unless the economy is in its stationary state. 
For example he notes: «The ordinary theory of distribution, where it is assumed that capital is 
getting now its marginal productivity (in some sense or other), is only valid in a stationary state. 
The aggregate current return to capital has no direct relationship to its marginal efficiency; whilst 
its current return at the margin of production (i.e. the return to capital which enters into the supply 
price of output) is its marginal user cost, which also has no close connection with its marginal 
efficiency» (GT, 139). For a related view see Minsky (1975, 96), while Pasinetti (1997, 218) 
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MEC is quite different from the works of classical economists and that it was 
«vital for his analysis» a concept that he devised «last of all, after an immense lot 
of muddling and many drafts» (Collected Writings  XIV, 85).   
 Thus, although Keynes did not really present an analytically coherent 
argument, his desire for pragmatism led him to the conclusion that the MEC 
schedule was much lower in the 1930s than in the nineteenth century. There is no 
doubt that Keynes thought of the falling MEC as an already accomplished fact: 
«Today and presumably for the future the schedule of the marginal efficiency of 
capital is, for a variety of reasons, much lower than it was in the nineteenth 
century» (GT, 308). Hence, Keynes essentially adopts Smith’s idea that the rate of 
interest, as a rule of thumb, can give us an approximate idea of both the level of 
the rate of profit and the direction of its long-term movement. Since in Keynes’s 
time there were no national income accounts and certainly no time series data on 
profits and investment,3 it seems that he was led to this conclusion by observing 
the evolution of the rate of interest, exactly as Smith did in his own time.4 For 
example, in the General Theory (ch. 16, 219) Keynes presents estimates of the 
long run average interest rate in the range of 2 to 2 ½ per cent, which is in fact 
equal to our estimates of the average interest rate on consols for the period 1900-
1936, whereas for the entire nineteenth century the average interest rate on consols 
was around 4 per cent.5 There is no doubt that Keynes was aware of both the 
limitations of his theoretical analysis and the need to be backed up by empirical 
evidence. For example he notes: «To develop the thesis [on the falling MEC] 
would occupy a book rather than a chapter, and would require a close examination 
of facts» (GT, 313). 
                                                        
argues that Garegnani’s critique of the MEC is misplaced. 
3 The national income and product accounts data for the years up until the first decades of the 
twentieth century were created mostly retrospectively and after the publication of the General 
Theory, which essentially created both the need for such data as well as the conceptual framework 
for the estimation of variables such as income, investment, consumption, saving, etc.  
4 Clearly, Keynes regarded the rate of interest and the rate of profit (or the MEC) as distinct and 
strictly separate economic categories. In fact, Keynes criticized those economists (like Mises and 
Hayek) of «confusing the marginal efficiency of capital with the rate of interest» (GT, 191-3 for a 
related analysis see also 173-4). 
5 Data on the real interest rate on consols come from Global Financial Data 
(www.globalfinancialdata.com). 
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3.  Falling MEC and the Depression 
The growing unemployment in Great Britain in the 1920s, which was converted to 
mass unemployment during the Great Depression of the 1930s made Keynes to 
redirect his intellectual efforts from monetary issues to those of unemployment. In 
his pamphlet Can Lloyd George Do It? (1929)—jointly written with Henderson—
Keynes supported Lloyd George in the 1929 general election in advocating debt-
financed public works as a means to reduce unemployment. The lack of an 
adequate theoretical backing of his thesis favouring public works led Keynes to 
the development of his General Theory. Thus, it has been argued that the General 
Theory would not have been written without the great depression; or in other 
words, the General Theory needed the great depression as much as the great 
depression needed the General Theory. In fact, Keynes follows a whole tradition 
of major economists who regarded that falling profitability, past a point, leads the 
economy to its depression stage. More specifically, Keynes (GT ch. 22) uses the 
analytical framework of chapters 11 and 12 in order to explain the occurrence and 
the regularity of business fluctuations («trade cycles») of various lengths, 
depending on the durability of fixed capital, and also to provide an explanation of 
the depression of the 1930s. Thus, Keynes’s analysis is not restricted to short run 
business cycles around a stable, albeit lower than the full employment level of 
output, but rather it is general enough to include cycles of long duration, which 
lead to breakdowns of the magnitude and importance of the depression in the 
1930s. Unlike the neoclassical economists of his time, who despite the fact that 
their theory did not include the occurrence of depressions as a systematic 
phenomenon; nevertheless, they were eager to provide policy proposals. Keynes, 
by contrast, not only provided a theoretical explanation of the occurrences of 
economic crises, but also his policy proposals were derived from his theoretical 
foundations. It is interesting to note that Keynes is consistent in his views over the 
years and in the General Theory (chs. 19, 22, 23, inter alia) discusses on the 
consequences of various policy proposals. 
 The following quotation from the Treatise of Money is quite revealing of 
Keynes’s outlook towards economic cycles: «I find myself in strong sympathy 
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with the school of writers—Tugan-Baranovski, Hull, Spiethoff and Schumpeter—
of which Tugan-Baranovski was the first and most original, and especially with 
the form which the theory takes in the works of Tugan-Baranovski himself […]. 
The fault of Tugan-Baranovski lay in his holding […] that savings can in some 
way accumulate during depressions in an uninvested form […] and also in his 
suggesting that this failure of savings to become materialised in investment at a 
steady rate is due to the unequal distribution of wealth instead of to Schumpeter’s 
‘innovations’ in conjunction with a failure of the banking system to respond in 
such a way as to preserve the desirable degree of stability» (Keynes, 1930, 2, 100-
101). Keynes displays consistency in his views over the years as this can be 
judged by a text that he wrote as early as 1912, when he stated that «[a]fter a crisis 
there is probably too little fixed capital; hence large profits for what there is; 
hence the creation of more fixed capital with the expectation of equal profits; 
hence creation of too much fixed capital» (Keynes papers UA/6/21/12, quoted in 
Barnett, 2001, 461). Hence, Keynes points out two kinds of disproportionalities 
the first between investment in fixed capital which falls short of (expected) 
profits; a disproportionality which is resolved through economic expansion. The 
second of fixed investment in excess of (expected) profits, a disproportinality 
which, this time, is resolved through an economic crisis. The same idea is 
repeated in the General Theory, where for example he notes «at the outset of the 
slump there is probably much capital of which the marginal efficiency has become 
negligible or even negative» (GT, 317-8) 
 Keynes with the Treatise and his other works available does not need to 
repeat these ideas in any detail in the General Theory, where he reiterates that the 
MEC «is of fundamental importance because it is mainly through this factor 
(much more than through the rate of interest) that the expectation of the future 
influences the present» (GT, 145) and that the business cycle «is mainly due to the 
way in which the marginal efficiency of capital fluctuates» (GT, 313).6 Keynes 
further argues that the downturn comes because of pessimism about the future of 
                     
6 Minsky (1975) argues that there is overlap between the Treatise and the General Theory «for 
they are both attempts to explain much of the same set of observations» (Minsky, 1975, 111, see 
also GT, 319).  
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the MEC: «The disillusion comes because doubts suddenly arise concerning the 
reliability of the perspective yield, perhaps because the current yield shows signs 
of falling off, as the stock of newly produced durable goods, steadily increases 
[…]. Once doubt begins it spreads rapidly» (GT, 317). This is why in the 
immediate aftermath of the onset of a major depression, such as that of 1929, 
monetary policy may be ineffective as an instrument for overcoming crises; the 
idea is that the crisis is not caused by rising interest rates but rather the other way 
around. The cause of crisis is identified with the fall in the MEC and the negative 
expectations that are formed about it. If entrepreneurs’ profit expectations become 
pessimistic (as in the case of a major depression) then any level of interest rate 
will be perceived as too high. Similarly, in the financial sector of the economy 
even excessively high interest rates might not be high enough to sway potential 
lenders to part with their liquidity by granting new loans for the fear of default 
risk. 
 Keynes (GT, 315-7) argued that investment spending depends on the 
difference between the subjective expected profitability and the objective long 
term rate of interest and that the crises are caused by a falling profitability which 
past a point leads to discouragement of investment since additional investment 
creates fewer profits than expected. More specifically, Keynes notes: «For the 
term overinvestment is ambiguous. It may refer to investments which are destined 
to disappoint the expectations which prompted them or for which there is no use 
in conditions of full employment, or it may indicate a state of affairs where every 
kind of capital goods is so abundant that there is no new investment which is 
expected, even in conditions of full employment, to earn in the course of its life 
more than its replacement cost. It is only the latter state of affairs which is one of 
over-investment strictly speaking, in the sense of any further investment would be 
a sheer waste of resources»  (GT, 321).  
 Clearly, Keynes’s concern is with the growth of investment, which past a 
point leads to the stagnation of profits thereby rendering redundant the new 
investment spending. For this reason, Keynes argues that this situation must be 
postponed if not avoided altogether, and the method to achieving this goal is, 
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certainly, not by increasing interest rates. His idea is that high interest rates 
discourage all investment and so some investment may be absolutely necessary for 
the normal growth of the economy. Furthermore, for Keynes the level of 
investment, is, almost never enough for the attainment of the full employment of 
labour. Keynes’s philosophy is that the «right remedy for the trade cycle is not to 
be found in abolishing booms and thus keeping us permanently in a semi slump; 
but in abolishing slumps and thus keeping us permanently in a quasi-boom» (GT, 
322).  He was also critical to those economists that thought that if investment 
exceeds saving this discrepancy must be eliminated by raising the interest rate 
(GT, 327-8).  
 According to Keynes investment spending should be encouraged to continue 
until the attainment of «full investment», that is, the point where the MEC is zero. 
Only past this point, we have overinvestment, in the «strict sense», that is to say, 
any additional investment would lower the MEC to a negative figure. As a 
consequence, there would be no incentives to invest for there are no extra profits. 
The following quotation that refers to the crisis of 1930s is particularly revealing 
of his view of the actual crisis mechanism: «It would be absurd to assert of the 
United States in 1929 the existence of over-investment in the strict sense. The true 
state of affairs was of a different character. New investment during the previous 
five years had been, indeed, on so enormous a scale in the aggregate that the 
prospective yield of further additional was, coolly considered, falling rapidly» 
(GT, 323). Hence, Keynes posits that the onset of crisis was in the year 1929, 
when the US economy reached a saturation point, in the sense that new investment 
could no longer generate rising profits, and that this situation, he explains, was not 
yet of the overinvestment of the strict sense type, since there were possibilities for 
postponing the occurrence of overinvestment (in the loose sense of the term) 
through policies that would stimulate effective demand and keep capital 
accumulation going. Of course, overinvestment in the strict sense is inevitable in 
Keynes’s analysis, but its occurrence can be postponed through long run policies 
that are accompanied by appropriate institutional changes and not just the usual 
mix of short run fiscal and monetary policies. 
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4. Economic Policies 
Keynes in his analysis of overinvestment in the loose sense of the term accepts the 
existing institutional arrangements and the associated distribution of income. For 
Keynes, the widespread unemployment stems from the failure of the market 
system to generate enough effective demand and not from the malfunction of the 
price mechanism. During depressions there is a deficiency of effective demand, 
which must be made up by increasing investment demand. In fact, having to 
choose between the two constituent components of effective demand, Keynes 
stresses the primacy of investment over consumption expenditures. His rationale 
is that there is always room for more investment which by creating incomes can 
also increase the demand for consumption (GT, 325). This does not mean that he 
did not think that consumption demand can be affected directly through policies 
aiming at increasing the propensity to consume. The reason is that despite the 
increase in investment expenditures, full employment is extremely difficult to 
attain, and if attained it is difficult to maintain with the existing propensity to 
consume. Consequently, Keynes favoured policies aiming at promoting 
investment spending provided that the propensity to consume ought to increase 
somewhat more than that required to match the increase in investment (GT, 325).    
 Keynes was also critical of the efforts of monetary authorities in the case of 
the upturn of the business cycle to fight over-optimism by raising the interest rate. 
He argued that the change the business climate from euphoria to pessimism would 
lead to the discouragement of all investment spending including of some which 
might be useful and absolutely necessary. The failure of higher interest rates to 
control a booming economy led Keynes to the idea of income redistribution 
policies as a way to reduced the MEC and slow down overinvestment. In fact, he 
pointed out that «even if overinvestment in this [loose] sense was a normal 
characteristic of the boom, the remedy would not lie in clapping on a high rate of 
interest which would probably deter some useful investments and might further 
diminish the propensity to consume, but in taking drastic steps, by redistributing 
incomes or otherwise, to stimulate the propensity to consume» (GT, 321). The 
rationale for such a policy is to keep the boom going, albeit at a lower rate in the 
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effort to avoid a certain slump that would be caused by overinvestment in the 
loose sense of the term. 
 It is important to stress at this juncture that Keynes’s views of depression 
must also take into account the link between the MEC and the liquidity 
preference, and this because as he noted «the dismay and uncertainty as to the 
future which accompanies a collapse in the MEC naturally precipitates a sharp 
increase in liquidity preference» (GT, 316). Under these circumstances, monetary 
policy as an instrument to drive down the interest rate in the effort to increase 
profitability might be ineffective for two reasons: First, because of the «liquidity 
trap», which raises the possibility that «after the interest rate has fallen to a certain 
level, liquidity preference may become absolute in the sense that almost everyone 
prefers cash to holding a debt which yields so low a rate of interest» (GT, 207).7 
Second, «the intermediate costs of bringing the borrower and ultimate lender 
together, and the allowance for risk, especially for moral risk, which the lender 
requires over and above the pure rate of interest» (GT, 208). The implication is 
that even though the monetary authority manages to reduce the rate of interest at a 
level near zero, nevertheless the cost of intermediation augmented to include a 
risk premium to compensate the lenders’ for the possibility of borrowers’ default 
makes the effective interest rate higher than the nominal achieved through the 
appropriate monetary policy.8 
 Keynes argued that the drastic fall in the MEC also tends to reduce the 
propensity to consume; the idea is that the stock market is adversely affected, 
which discourages consumption expenditures. This effect becomes more severe in 
a «stock minded public» (GT, 319) as in the USA, where the fall in the stock 
market lowers the propensity to consume which in turn precipitates the fall in the 
MEC. 
 Finally, he dealt in detail with the effects of a fall in money wages and the 
possibility of curing unemployment and, therefore, leading the economy out of its 
                     
7 It is important to point out that the notion of liquidity trap went to the oblivion in the decades of 
1970s and 1980s and resurfaced again in the 1990s. 
8  Minsky (1975) elaborated further Keynes’s key ideas of lenders’ and borrowers’ risk and 
incorporated them as the principal determinants of investment behaviour. 
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depression stage. Keynes argued that the fall in money wages works through the 
MEC, the liquidity preference and the multiplier. It is important to note that in the 
fall of money wages Keynes recognized an inconsistency in his thesis about the 
inability of the market system to generate effective demand to the amounts 
required for the establishment of full employment: «It is, therefore, on the effect of 
a falling wage- and price level on the demand for money that those who believe in 
the self-adjusting quality of the economic system must rest the weight of their 
argument; though I am not aware that they have done so» (GT, 266).  
 Keynes examined three scenarios of the possible effects of a fall in wages 
during a period of depression (GT, ch. 19). First as money wages fall, the price 
level follows suit and the value of assets (of rich consumers) rises, thereby 
increasing the marginal propensity to save and lowering the value of the 
multiplier; on the other hand, the lower incomes decrease the marginal propensity 
to save and increase the value of the multiplier. The net effect of these two 
counteracting tendencies is ambiguous and in any case one does not expect any 
substantial changes in output and employment. Second, as the money wages fall 
the MEC increases and with that investment and employment, meanwhile the fall 
in money wages may lead to expectations of a lower price level which may give 
rise to expectations of a lower MEC, once again it is hard to predict the net effect 
of these two counteracting movements. Third, the fall in money wages reduces the 
transaction demand for money and increases the speculative demand for money; 
thus, the rate of interest falls and stimulates investment spending and so the level 
of output and employment increase. As a result, one may conjecture that a 
sufficiently large reduction in money wages may lead to the full employment of 
labour. Keynes, however, posited that this is only a theoretical result and it is only 
valid for a moderate fall in money wage which elicit moderate changes in output 
and employment. A substantial fall in money wages, Keynes argued, might lead to 
quite opposite results and this because of the chaos that will be created in the 
economy and the resulting uncertainty would disrupt the systematic relationships 
among variables: «The chief result of this policy would be to cause a great 
instability of prices, so violent perhaps as to make business calculations futile in 
15 
 
 
 
 
an economic society functioning after a manner of that in which we live» (GT, 
269). It is important to point out that Keynes does not completely rule out the 
effectiveness of wage cuts to establish full employment in case of authoritative 
governments of his time, such as those of Germany, Italy and Russia (GT, 269).   
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper has argued that Keynes makes expected profitability and its evolution 
the lynchpin of his analysis of the rhythm of capital accumulation. Keynes’s 
exegesis of the tendency of profitability to fall in the long run, which leads to 
economic crisis, has been largely misunderstood and its importance has been 
downplayed in the subsequent literature. However, Keynes following a long 
tradition of economists adopted the idea of the long run falling profitability, as he 
expressed it in the movement of the MEC. Moreover, he argued that a declining 
MEC is internally generated by an economic system, whose motion originates in 
expected profitability. This is the reason why Keynes was so much interested in 
the future of the system, and, most of all, the maintenance of its capitalist 
character.  
 Keynes’s concern is absolutely understood, if we think of the two alternative 
systems of his time, the national and the soviet type «socialisms». This is the 
historical context that we should place the exercise of caution with respect to the 
manipulation of investment, when he arrives at the conclusion that «the duty of 
ordering the current volume of investment cannot safely be left in private hands» 
(GT, 320). His plea for substantial reforms, with «a gradual disappearance of the 
rate of return on accumulated wealth» providing «a sensible way of gradually 
getting rid of many of the objectionable features of capitalism [...]» (GT, 221), 
otherwise the «socialist» alternative would prevail. Keynes’s fairly radical 
conclusions, with today’s standards as well as the difficulty of his theoretical 
arguments for they were not cast in terms of the «habitual modes of thinking», led 
many of his commentators to the relegation of the notion of the MEC and the 
associated with it business cycles to secondary importance. However, by ignoring 
the falling MEC from Keynes's overall theory of effective demand, we are left 
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with an enormous lacuna and, therefore, our understanding of the way in which 
the system operates, since profitability and its evolution shape both the present 
and the future of a system in continuous motion. 
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